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Abstract: Cooperatives and investor-owned firms are alternative forms of business organisation that coexist and compete in 
many  markets.  The  theoretical  literature  has  identified  a  number  of  comparative  advantages  and  disadvantages  of 
cooperatives. Decentralized decision making within cooperatives may lead to quality coordination problems (free-riding on 
product quality), for example: whereas the individual member has to bear the full costs associated with higher quality, the 
benefits of delivering higher quality will be shared among all members. The present paper investigates this free-riding 
problem in determining product quality within a marketing cooperative in a vertically related market (food chain).  
On the basis of a mixed-oligopoly model, we show that the free-rider problem in the supply of high-quality products might be 
strong  enough  to  ensure  that  cooperatives  will  never  supply  higher  quality  than  investor-owned  firms.  Whether  the 
cooperative can overcome the free-riding problem and supply a final product of high quality is shown to depend on the 
consumer’s valuation of quality, the costs of producing high quality, the way in which the quality of the final product is 
determined from the quality levels of the inputs delivered, the possibilities in controlling product quantity as well as on the 
number of members of the cooperative. 
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1. Introduction 
Cooperatives and investor-owned firms are alternative forms of business organisation that coexist and compete 
in many markets. The theoretical literature has identified a number of comparative advantages and disadvantages 
of cooperatives (Fulton 1995; Albaek and Schultz 1998; Karantininis/Zago 2001; Bogetoft 2005). A classical 
problem of traditional cooperatives is the quantity coordination problem, which arises from the decentralised 
decision making of the members of a cooperative (Phillips 1953). Each member (farmer) decides how much to 
deliver to the cooperative and the cooperative thus has no control over what is actually supplied to the market. 
Although an individual farmer realizes that an increase in production reduces the price in the final market, he 
does not internalize the profit loss stemming from the price decrease incurred by the other members of the 
cooperative (free-riding).
1 
Decentralized decision making within a cooperative also leads to quality coordination problems, which could be 
considered even more detrimental to the prosperity of cooperatives since, in contrast to quantities, the quality 
delivered  by  individual  members  very  often  is  difficult  to  verify  and  might  be  non-contractible  between 
independent actors. The problem of free-riding on product quality with decentralized decision making is a well-
recognized problem in the literature on cooperatives (see, among others, Cook 1995 and Fulton 1995) and is 
nicely illustrated in Babcock and Weninger’s (2004: 14) case study of the Alaskan Salmon Industry: ‘... suppose 
two fishermen deliver to a single processor. The fishermen know that part of the investment in quality that 
increases price will end up in the pocket of the other fisherman. The two fishermen get roughly a half-share of 
the benefit of quality-control efforts, yet both bear the full cost of those efforts’. Similar observations have been 
made for cooperatives in wine production in Germany (Dilger 2005).  
                                                 
1   Albaek  and  Schultz  (1998)  investigate  the  consequences  of  this  behaviour  in  a  market,  where  the 
cooperative competes with an investor owned firm (mixed duopoly). The authors find that due to the 
decentralisation  of  output  decisions,  cooperatives  tend  to  overproduce.  Interestingly,  this  negative 
externality  turns  out  to  be  a  comparative  advantage  of  cooperatives  in  Cournot  competition. 
Overproduction in the cooperative serves as a commitment device for credibly and profitably gaining 
market shares: ‘… the results of this paper suggest that in the long run all farmers would be members of 
the cooperative’ (Albaek and Schultz 1998: 401).   3 
 
The present paper investigates this free-riding problem in determining quantity and quality within a marketing 
cooperative in a vertically related market. Upstream firms (farmers) deliver inputs to the downstream market, 
where a cooperative and / or an investor-owned firm use the components delivered to produce a composite good 
which is then sold to consumers. We compare a cooperative acting as a monopolist to an investor-owned firm as 
the only manufacturer and, in a second step, analyze a mixed duopoly market. In contrast to previous studies on 
quality competition in an oligopolistic market (Lehmann-Grube 1997; Choi and Shin 1992; Hoffmann 2005) the 
decisions  which  manufacturer  actually  delivers  the  high  quality  product  is  endogenous  here.  Whether  the 
cooperative can overcome the free-riding (coordination) problem and supply a final product of high quality is 
shown to depend on the consumer’s valuation of quality, the costs of producing high quality, the way in which 
the quality of the final product is determined from the quality levels of the inputs delivered as well as on the 
number of members of the cooperative. In a monopolist setting we find that (i) even if the cooperative can 
control the quantity problem, the cooperative will never supply a final good of a higher quality than the firm. We 
further  find  that  the  quantity  and  the  quality  coordination  problem  are  closely  related  and  that  (ii)  if  the 
cooperative faces a free-rider problem with respect to quantity, the quality coordination problem aggravates and 
the cooperative will certainly deliver products of lower quality than the firm in a number of scenarios. When a 
cooperative and an investor-own firm compete in the downstream market (mixed duopoly setting), we find that 
(iii) in general the quality of the composite good of the firm will be at least as high as the product of the 
cooperative (and certainly of a higher quality in some scenarios) except (iv) if the quality of the final good is 
determined by the minimum quality of its components, where no clear results can be derived. 
Section 2 provides a brief literature review on related studies. In section 3 we set up the model. Section 4 
compares the quality decision of a firm and a cooperative acting as a monopolist, whereas section 5 considers a 
mixed oligopoly setting, where a cooperative and a firm compete with each other. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Related literature 
Since the beginning of the 1990’s, a number of authors have investigated the quality choice in ‘pure’ duopolies 
with two investor-owned firms. In pure duopolies it is a well-established result that the firm producing higher 
quality earns higher profits, irrespective whether producing higher quality increases fixed costs (Lehmann-Grube 
1997; Motta 1993), variable costs (Motta 1993) or does not influence costs at all (Choi and Shin 1992). The 
decision which of the two rivals produces the higher quality product however is not derived endogenously in 
these studies since the duopolists typically are assumed to be identical ex ante.  
In the spirit of Tirole’s (1996) model of collective reputation, Winfree and McCluskey (2005) investigate the 
individual firms’ incentive to choose quality levels. The authors assume that firms in the group share a common 
reputation, which is based on the groups’ past average quality. It is shown that individual firms have an incentive 
to produce lower quality and free ride on the good group reputation. Free-riding becomes more important as the 
number of firms increases. 
Our paper is most closely related to the analysis of Hoffmann (2005) and Herbst and Prüfer (2007). Hoffmann 
(2005) investigates firms’ price and quality choices under different ownership structures (mixed duopoly) in a 
vertically  related  market.  If  the  downstream  firm  decides  about  product  quality  whereas  the  fixed  costs  of 
producing high quality are to be paid by the upstream supplier, the firm will underestimate the full costs of 
delivering high quality. If upstream suppliers also sell their products downstream through a cooperative, the 
fixed costs associated with higher quality are considered in the cooperative’s decision about the quality of the 
final  product.  Hoffmann  (2005)  shows  that  investor  owned  firms  choose  a  higher  level  of  quality  than 
cooperatives  in  markets  where  the  costs  of  producing  high  quality  are  fixed.  On  the  basis  of  numerical 
calculations the author suggests that the conclusion is reversed in markets where producing high quality raises 
variable costs of production.  
Herbst and Prüfer (2007) compare the decisions about product quality in three organisations (firms, cooperatives 
and  nonprofits).  The  problems  of  coordination  within  the  cooperative  are  captured  by  introducing  costs  of 
collective  decision  making  which  increase  with  the  heterogeneity  of  a  cooperative’s  members.  Firms  are 
assumed to care about profits only (shareholders of a firm do not consume the good produced themselves). The 
pure focus on financial returns implies a perfect goal alignment among shareholders and a firm thus does not 
have to bear any costs of collective decision making. Members of a cooperative on the other hand are assumed to 
care about both: dividends as well as consumer surplus (per assumption, members also act as consumers of the 
products produced). If individual members’ preferences for quality differ, the cooperative incurs extra costs of 
collective decision making. The differences in incentives as well as the costs of decision making between a firm 
and a cooperative also has implications for the decisions about product quality. The indirect utility of members 
from consuming the products produced provides an additional incentive for the cooperative to deliver products 
of  higher  quality.  Herbst  and  Prüfer  (2007)  thus  suggest  that  firms  provide  lower  levels  of  quality  than   4 
 
cooperatives. In the present paper, we will explicitly analyze the decision making of the individual members 
instead of trying to capture them with a rather unspecific term of ‘transaction costs’ (‘costs of decision making’). 
In addition, we will specifically focus on the strategic interaction effects between a firm and a cooperative in a 
mixed duopoly which are neglected in Herbst and Prüfer (2007).
2 
Empirical evidence on ownership structure and product quality is scarce. Few studies have attempted to measure 
the market performance of cooperatives. Haller (1985) compares prices of cooperative brands relative to leading 
non-cooperative brands in the US and finds significantly lower prices for cooperatives. However, ‘it is not 
possible to determine whether the lower prices observed by cooperatives’ brands were due to differences in the 
type of products sold by cooperatives’ (p. 190). Similar findings are reported in Haller (1993) for cottage cheese 
for 47 US metropolitan areas. Whether lower prices in cooperatives are the result of a lower quality of their 
products thus is unclear.  
According to our knowledge, the only direct empirical evidence on ownership structure and product quality is 
provided in Frick (2004) and Dilger (2005). The authors find that cooperatives in the German wine sector offer a 
significantly lower quality compared to investor-owned firms (farms). Dilger (2005) observes, that members of a 
wine  cooperative  are  normally  paid  according  to  the  quantity  they  deliver  as  long  as  they  preserve  some 
minimum quality requirements. Accordingly, cooperatives face a free-rider problem. Whereas the individual 
member has to bear all costs associated with higher quality of inputs delivered to the cooperative, the benefits of 
delivering higher quality have to be shared among all members.  
3. The model 
To investigate the relationship between ownership structure and product quality, we follow Albaek and Schultz 
(1998) as well as Karantininis and Zago (2001) and consider a situation where there are two manufacturers and n 
farmers who sell through one or the other. We call one manufacturer the cooperative (C) and the other the 
investor-owned firm, for short the firm (F). From the n farmers, nC deliver to the cooperative and nF to the firm 
( C F n n n + = ). If a farmer delivers to the cooperative, he has to decide whether to produce high or low quality 
and what quantity (q) to produce and to deliver. On the other hand, the decision-making process of the firm is 
centralised: the firm decides, which quantity and which quality each farmer has to deliver to the firm.  
The manufacturers use the components delivered from the farmers and produce a composite good which is then 
sold to consumers. The quantity and the quality of the final product are solely determined by the quantity and the 
quality of the inputs. Each farmer’s product is associated with a number  0 >
g
i s ,  } , { L H g Î  which represents its 
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Consumers’ preferences are formalized in the spirit of Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) and Tirole (1988). There is 
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All consumers prefer higher quality at a given price, but a consumer with higher q
~
 is willing to pay more for 
higher quality. The parameter q  measures the degree of consumer differentiation in evaluating product quality. 
The inverse demand functions for high and low quality are  
  s Q Q Q p
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  and  (2)  
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where 
H Q  and 
L Q  is the aggregate quantity of the high and low quality product respectively.  
                                                 
2   In  Herbst  and  Prüfer’s  (2007)  analysis,  consumers  choose  between  the  product  offered  by  the 
organisation considered (the firm, the nonprofit or the cooperative) and an imperfect substitute produced 
by  a  competitive  fringe  in  an  alternative  market.  The  price  and  the  quality  of  the  substitute  are 
exogenously given and a strategic interdependency between the suppliers thus is ignored.  
3   We use subscripts to denote organisational forms (C and F) and superscripts to identify the level of 
product quality.   5 
 
As the decision process is centralized for the firm, there is no doubt in assessing the product quality of the firm: 
All  farmers  supplying  the  firm  either  produce  high  or  low  quality.  The  quality  of  the  final  product  of  the 
cooperative  is  determined  as  the  (weighted)  average  of  the  quality  of  inputs  delivered  by  farmers.  This 
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4 As the members of 
the  cooperative  might  choose  different  quality  levels,  the  cooperative  can  produce  a  final  good  of  ‘mixed 
quality’. Consumers perceive this mixed quality as high quality (and are therefore willing to pay p
H) if there is no 
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T s  is a certain ‘threshold quality’ with 
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5  This  specification  includes  an  aggregation  function  proposed  by  Economides  (1999),  who 
assumes that the quality of the  manufacturers’ composite good is the  minimum of the quality levels of its 
components (the inputs delivered by all individual farmers). In this case 
H T s s =  and the aggregation function of 
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- + = . The multiplicative interaction between quality levels provided by the different farmers 
implies that the final product will be of high quality only if all farmers deliver high quality. As soon as one 
farmer delivers low quality the final product will be of low quality. We start with discussing the implications of 
the ‘O-Ring’ form for the quality aggregation function, the consequences when assuming a linear aggregation 
function (excluding the special case of the ‘O-Ring’ form) will be discussed later.
7 
We assume that manufacturers have constant marginal costs which are normalized to zero. Farmers, on the other 
hand, have positive production costs. Producing high quality inputs is assumed more costly then producing low 
quality inputs: 




) (  with
L H f f > . To simplify notation, we normalize  0 =
L f  and  0 ³ = f f
H . 
For a given product quality, all farmers have the same production technology.
8  
Due to the ‘individualistic’ decision-making process of the cooperative, where each member decides how much 
and which quality to deliver, the cooperative has no control over what is actually supplied to the market. The 
                                                 
4   The linear aggregation function might be plausible in the case of wine production for example, where the 
quality of the wine depends on the quality of all grapes delivered. 
5   The weights are assumed to be 
C n
1  for each member. This simplifies the analysis, as an individual farmer 
can affect aggregate quality only by changing his quality level and not by changing his output. The 
assumption is justified ex-post, because if the cooperative produces mixed quality, all farmers produce the 
same quantity, irrespective of their individual quality levels (as quality affects only fixed, but not variable 
costs; see below). 
6   The  failure  of  the  launching  of  the  space  shuttle  was  entirely  due  to  the  malfunctioning  of  a  small 
component, the ‘O-Ring’. Kremer (1993) analyses the implications of an O-Ring production function for 
economic development. In an industrial organization framework, Economides (1999: 903) motivates this 
assumption with the following example: ‚a long distance call requires the use of long distance lines as 
well  as  local  lines  at  the  two  terminating  points.  The  fidelity  of  sound  in  such  a  phone  call  is  the 
minimum of the qualities of the three services used’. The probability of success of a complex process is 
given by the joint probability of success of all its parts. 
7   One could consider the implications of a third form of the quality aggregation function which assumes 
that the quality of the final product is determined by the highest quality of the inputs delivered. In this 
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.  We  consider  this 
assumption to be rather unrealistic and will not consider this case further here. 
8   Note that different assumptions concerning the cost of quality have been made in the literature so far. 
Here, we do not consider the cost of quality as a variable cost component which considerably simplifies 
the analysis. Assuming a change in product quality to influence variable costs introduces an additional 
interdependence between quantity and quality decisions of manufacturers. A detailed discussion of this 
issue is available in Hoffmann (2005). An interesting extension would also be to consider heterogenous 
farmers  and  investigate,  which  type  of  farmer  delivers  to  the  cooperative  and  the  firm  respectively. 
Karantinides and Zago (2001) investigate this issue in more detail.   6 
 
extent to which the individual members of the cooperative coordinate their output decisions will be represented 







º l  for  j i ¹ . We view l as the outcome of some unknown game,  1 = l  would imply 
perfect  coordination,  0 = l   corresponds  to  Cournot-behaviour  within  the  cooperative.  The  cooperative  also 
retains no profit. Without free-riding on quality (which will be analyzed below), an individual members’ profit 
depends on the prices received (p
H or p









p .  (3) 
The firm on the other hand is characterised by ‘centralised’ decision making. Following Albaek and Schultz 
(1998), we assume that the firm has a (perfect) contract with farmers specifying the quantity as well as the 
quality of their inputs. As the distribution of profits between farmers and the firm is not essential here, the firm’s 
behaviour can be described as if it maximises the vertically integrated profit of itself and its suppliers. In order to 
facilitate comparison with the behaviour of the cooperative, we follow Albaek and Schultz (1998) in assuming 
that the vertically integrated profit is distributed among all farmers delivering to the firm.
9 By assumption, there 
is thus no difference between the firm and the cooperative in our model with respect to the degree of vertical 
integration: the cooperative is vertically integrated and the firm acts as if it is vertically integrated. This allows us 
to focus on the implications of coordination in decision making for the provision of product quality. 
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4. The cooperative and the firm as monopolists 
This section compares the behaviour of the firm and the cooperative in a situation, where there is only one 
manufacturer (the cooperative or the firm) and all n farmers in the market sell their products via this monopolist. 
Consider the situation of a profit maximising firm first. Maximizing profits in (2) with respect to  F Q  gives 
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M F , , p p > . Quality choices can be illustrated by means of an 
‘isoprofit’ contour ( M F IP , in Figure 1).  
 
< Figure 1 around here > 
 
If f = 0 and s = 0, there are no quality differences (neither in production costs nor in the consumers’ willingness 
to pay for quality), and so the isoprofit curve  M F IP ,  originates in this point. As the costs of producing a high 
quality product relative to a low quality product (f) increases, the consumers’ willingness to pay for higher 
quality (s) also has to increases in order to guarantee each farmer the same level of profits (the isoprofit curves 
slope upwards, see proposition 1 in the appendix
10). If, for a given s = s1, the additional costs of producing high 
quality (f) are large (f > f1), the firm  will choose to supply  low quality.  Area A in  Figure 1 represents all 
combinations of f and s where the firm (as a monopolist) delivers low quality. The firm delivers high quality in 
areas B and C. 
                                                 
9  An alternative would be to view the firm as acting in a Cournot duopsony. As long as farmers patronizing 
the firm are price takers, the firm  will pay according to the farmers’ supply function (i.e. aggregate 
marginal costs). A detailed discussion of the effects of buyer market power of downstream manufacturers 
towards upstream firms (farmers) in a mixed duopoly is available in Tennbakk (1995). 
10   The appendix is available from the authors upon request.   7 
 
Now  compare  this  situation  to  a  market  in  which  a  cooperative  is  the  only  manufacturer  (monopolist). 
Decentralised decision making within the cooperative implies that each member (farmer) decides how much and 
which quality to deliver. The cooperative thus faces two (interrelated) coordination problems: a quantity and a 
quality control problem. The following payoff matrix (Table 1) illustrates the decision making process according 
to the quality a member of the cooperative. The left column of the matrix describes the quality decision of the 
other members of the cooperative in contrast to the threshold quality. 
 
< Table 1 around here > 
 
In the first (third) line of the payoff matrix, the final product is perceived as a high (low) quality product, 
irrespective of the quality decision of the firm. In both situations member i will produce low quality, which 
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+ ). Table 1 therefore 
suggests the possibility of two Nash equilibria in the decision making within the cooperative: It is always an 




M C , , p p >  this is the only equilibrium and 
producing low quality is the dominant strategy. It can be an equilibrium that the cooperative produces a quality 




M C , , p p ³ . The 
indeterminacy  of  the  equilibrium  in  the  quality  decisions  within  the  cooperative  however  implies  that  the 
cooperative could also end up producing the low quality product even if producing high quality would generate 
higher profits for all members (coordination problem). 
The  ‘O-Ring’  specification  for  the  aggregation  of  product  quality  implies  that  the  final  product  of  the 
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 and the first line in Table 1 does not exist. As soon as one member delivers low 
quality, the final product falls below the threshold will also be of low quality.  
To investigate the factors influencing 
H
M C, p  and 
L
M C, p , we maximizes profits in equation (3) with respect to 
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p . Note that if quantity decisions are perfectly coordinated ( 1 = l ), output levels 








M C , , p p = ). Assuming away the quantity control problem within the cooperative implies that the isoprofit 
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M C M F IP IP . In area A the cooperative acts as the firm and delivers low 
quality, whereas we find two Nash equlibria in area B and C: all members either produce high or low quality.  
If, however, quantity decisions within the cooperative are not perfectly coordinated ( 1 < l ), we find that the 
incentive  to  supply  high  quality  for  the  cooperative  is  smaller,  ceteris  paribus.  With  imperfect  quantity 






). As the aggregate quantity supplied to the 
market increases, the consumers willingness to pay for higher quality decreases,
11 which reduces 
H
M C, p  relative to 
L





M C M F IP IP  (see proposition 2 in the appendix). Area B in Figure 1 represents all 
combinations of f and s, where the firm (as a monopolist) delivers high quality, whereas the product of the 
cooperative (as a monopolist) is of low quality. In area C we again have two Nash equilibria for decision making 
within the cooperative: ‘pure’ high and ‘pure’ low quality. 
                                                 
11   Note from equation (4) that  ( )
H L H p p Q s q - = -  is a decreasing function of Q
H.   8 
 
Note that an increase in the number of farmers delivering to the manufacturer (n) reduces the incentive to supply 
high quality. For both manufacturers acting as monopolists the aggregate output increases with n (although 
output  per  member  declines  with  n),  since  production  costs  per  unit  decline.  The  price  increase  which  is 
associated with delivering high instead of low quality declines with aggregate quantity. Supplying high quality 
thus becomes less attractive.  
The results derived so far illustrate the quality coordination problem within the cooperative. Although the quality 
of  products  delivered  by  a  cooperative  can  be  the  same  as  those  produced  by  a  profit  maximizing  firm,  a 
cooperative  will  deliver  lower  quality  in  a  number  of  scenarios.  In  contrast,  there  is  no  combination  of 
parameters in this model where the cooperative would deliver higher quality than the firm. The coordination 
problem in the ‘O-Ring’ specification is, however, not a free-riding problem in the classical sense: One member 
cannot benefit from the decision of the other members to produce high quality inputs (via a higher market price), 
without delivering high quality herself. The results further suggest that the coordination problem with respect to 
quality and quantity within the cooperative are closely related. Improving the coordination problem with respect 
to quantity also helps to reduce the quality coordination problem.  
These results are similar if the quality of the final product is assumed to be the weighted average of the quality of 
the inputs. As the profit levels for a member of the cooperative (
H
M C, p  and 
L
M C, p ) are independent of the two 
different aggregation functions discussed, the isoprofit curves in Figure 1 do not change. The only difference is 
that  the  cooperative  will  produce  a  mixed  quality  (instead  of  a  ‘pure’  high  quality  as  in  the  ‘O-Ring’ 
specification), just good enough to pass the threshold quality. As in the ‘O-Ring’ specification we observe a 




M C , , p p >  we find two Nash-equilibria: The cooperative cannot ensure, 
that the quality of the final product will be high enough. Additionally, we observe a free-rider problem: Some 
farmers  produce  high  quality  to  preserve  the  threshold  requirement  (to  receive  p
H),  while  others  free-ride, 




M C , , p p >
+ ). 
The specific form in which the quality of inputs is aggregated is even more important in situations where the 
cooperative and the firm compete in the downstream market (mixed duopoly). 
5. The cooperative and the firm in a mixed duopoly 
Assume that the firm and the members of the cooperative have to decide simultaneously about quality and output 
levels. The optimal output decisions for the cooperative and the firm will depend on their own as well as their 






























 from (2) 
and solving for 
g
C q  and 
g
F q . The corresponding levels of profits for the individual members of the cooperative 
as well as for the farmers supplying the firm for all combinations of quality levels are summarized in Table 2.
12 
 
< Table 2 around here > 
 
The choice of quality levels and the corresponding profits of individual farmers depend on parameters q, l, s and 
f, as well as on the number of firms nC and nF. The implications of the quantity coordination problem within the 
cooperative ( 1 < l ) as well as the effects of changes in the number of upstream firms (n ) have already been 
described in the previous section. To keep the following discussion as simple as possible and to focus on the 
quality decisions, we ignore the quantity coordination problem and assume  1 = l . Any difference in product 
quality between the cooperative and the firm are not caused by the well known ‘quantity control problem’ of the 
cooperative  (described  above  for  the  monopoly  case).  We  further  restrict  our  attention  to  the  ‘closed 
                                                 
12   In the following we denote the farmers’ profits with 
LL p  and 
HH p  when both manufacturers deliver low 
quality (superscript LL) or high quality (superscript HH). Farmers’ profits are 
L p  (
H p ) when they supply 
a manufacturer whose product is of low (high) quality whereas the quality of the rival’s product is of high 
(low) quality. Note that HH is only possible if all members of the cooperative produce high quality and 
that if C=H and F=L the profits of those members of the cooperative, who free-ride and produce low 
quality increases by f.   9 
 
membership’ case where each farmer has already decided whether to deliver to the firm or to the cooperative and 
for simplicity we assume 
2
n
n n F C = =  to be exogenously given.
13 
5.1. Aggregation of product quality: ‘O-Ring form’ 
In this scenario, the quality of the manufacturers’ composite good is determined by the minimum of the quality 
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=
- + = . In contrast to the monopoly case 
discussed in section 4, each manufacturer now has to consider the quality decision of its rival in determining his 
optimal level of quality. This interdependence in decision making as well as the equilibrium configuration of 
quality levels offered by the two manufacturers is shown in Figure 2.  
 
< Figure 2 around here > 
 
Figure  2  shows  isoprofit  contours  for  the  firm  and  the  cooperative  for  given  parameters  (n,  q ,  and  c). 
Assuming  perfect  coordination  in  output  decisions  within  the  cooperative  implies  that  the  firm  and  the 
















C p p = . This implies that the isoprofit curves for the firm and the cooperative are 
identical: 
1 1
C F IP IP º  and 
2 2
C F IP IP º . 
1
F IP  and 
1
C IP  are the isoprofit curves for the firm and the cooperative 
respectively  assuming  that  the  rival  delivers  low  quality,  whereas 
2
F IP   and 
2
C IP   denote  the  corresponding 
isoprofit curves given that the rival delivers high quality. Note that 
2 1
F F IP IP >  and 
2 1
C C IP IP > : the decision of the 
firm to produce high instead of low quality reduces the incentives of the cooperative to produce high quality too, 
and  vice  versa  (for  a  formal  analysis  see  proposition  3  in  the  appendix).  The  two  manufacturers  have  an 
incentive to differentiate vertically. It is well known from the results of ‘first-quality-then-price games’ (Shaked 
and Sutton, 1982) that vertical differentiation reduces the intensity of competition in the product market. 
The model suggests three different equilibrium configurations (areas A, B, and C). Both manufacturers will offer 
low quality products in area A. Area B represents combinations of f and s where either the firm or the cooperative 
delivers high quality and the rival will prefer to produce low quality. Finally, the firm will deliver high quality 
products whereas offering high or low quality can both be a Nash-equilibrium in the decision making process 
within the cooperative in area C.  
To discuss these results in more detail, assume  0 1 > = s s . If the additional costs of producing high quality (f) 
are large enough (f > f1), the dominant strategy of all members of the cooperative as well as the firm is to supply 
low quality. Area A in Figure 1 represents all combinations of f and s where both the firm and the cooperative 
deliver low quality.  
As f decreases below f1 (area B) the decisions about quality are interdependent: the firm will choose to produce 
high quality, if the cooperative produces low quality (since we are below 
1
F IP ), but the firm will opt for low 
quality, if the cooperative produces high quality (since we are above 
2
F IP ). The reason is that the price increase 
the firm can realize from producing high instead of low quality products is smaller if the cooperative produces 
high quality already (see footnote 10). The cooperative’s decision in turn is illustrated in the following payoff 
matrix. 
 
< Table 3 around here > 
                                                 
13   The point here is to illustrate how differences in  the degree of coordination  in the  decision  making 
process as well as the way in which aggregate quality is produced from the inputs delivered result in 
differences  in  strategic  behavior  in  the  final  market.  The  explanation  of  how  the  market  division  is 
determined in the first place is not an issue here, the implications of  F C n n ¹  in a mixed duopoly will be 
briefly discussed in the final section of the paper. A detailed analysis of the implications of different 
access policies for financing and growth of an open-membership cooperative is available in Rey and 
Tirole (2007).   10 
 
 
If the firm produces high quality (the situation described in the second payoff-matrix), the dominant strategy for 





C p p  and as we are above 
2
C IP , which implies 
L HH
C C p p > ). If, on the other hand, the firm offers low quality (the situation described in the first payoff-matrix), 
Table 3 suggests the existence of two Nash-equilibria: The first line of the payoff matrix does not exist in the ‘O-
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C p p  and as we are below 
1




C p p > ). Note however, that the 
second Nash-equilibrium in the decision making process within the cooperative (producing low quality) turns 
out to be inconsistent with a Nash-equilibrium in the game between the firm and the cooperative: as argued 
above the firm would not want to produce low quality in area B if the product of the cooperative is of low 
quality. We can thus conclude that the behaviour of the two rivals for all combinations of f and s in area B will 
be characterised by vertical product differentiation: the two manufacturers supply different levels of quality. 
As the fixed costs associated with producing high quality further decrease and  2 f f < , the incentive for the firm 
to produce high quality is strong enough to guarantee that the firm will always produce high quality, irrespective 
of the quality decisions of the members of the cooperative. The decision making within the cooperative on the 
other  hand  is  still  characterised  by  the  existence  of  two  Nash-equilibria,  one  in  which  all  members  of  the 
cooperative produce high quality and a second one, where all members deliver low quality. This can be seen 









C p p ). Area C in Figure 1 thus 
represents combinations of s and f where the firm produces high quality and the cooperative offers either high or 
low quality. 
Under the assumption of the ‘O-Ring’ technology for the aggregation of product quality, the present analysis 
does not provide a general prediction as to the whether the firm or the cooperative provides higher quality. The 
coordination  problem  in  the  supply  of  high-quality  products,  although  important  for  the  members  of  the 
cooperative, is not strong enough to ensure that firms will always deliver a quality that is at least as high as the 
quality supplied by the cooperative. 
5.2. Aggregation of product quality: the linear form 
Assuming the production process for product quality to be of a linear form has important consequences for the 
equilibrium quality decisions of the rivals. Whereas the equilibrium configuration is unchanged in area A (both 
rivals  prefer  to  produce  low  quality)  and  area  C  (the  firm  delivers  high  quality  and  all  members  of  the 
cooperative will produce either high or low quality),
14 the situation is different in area B in Figure 2.  
If the firm delivers high quality, the dominant strategy for all members of the cooperative is to produce low 
quality, which corresponds to the results derived in the previous section. If the firm decides to produce low 
quality instead, we find two equilibria in the cooperative’s decision (see first payoff matrix in Table 3): One 





C p p ). The second equilibrium is a mixed 




C p p > ). However, the cooperative will never 
produce a final product of ‘pure’ high quality, as some members can save production costs without altering the 




C p p >
+ ). As in the ‘O-Ring’ specification, the cooperative cannot 
ensure that the quality of the final product is high enough to pass the threshold. Additionally (and contrary to the 
O-Ring specification) some members produce high quality inputs to preserve the threshold quality, will others 
free-ride, produce low quality and gain higher profits. 
If the cooperative produces low quality, the firm will immediately switch to high quality. But how would the 
firm respond to the decision of the cooperative to supply ‘mixed quality’? Note, that a ‘mixed quality’ of the 
cooperative implies that the firms’ product would be of higher (lower) quality than the cooperatives’ product if 




F p p = . 




F p p =  are represented by the isoprofit contour 
3
F IP  in Figure 2. Proposition 
4 in the appendix shows that 
1 3
F F IP IP > , which implies that it is always attractive for the firm to produce high 
quality if the cooperative delivers ‘mixed quality’. The firm producing high and the cooperative delivering low 
                                                 
14   Note that all members have to produce high quality (independent of the threshold quality) in order to 
match the high quality product of the firm.  11 
 
quality products is therefore the only remaining equilibrium in area B. In markets, where the average quality of 
the inputs determines the quality of the final product, the free-riding problem within the cooperative implies that 
the cooperative in our modelling framework will never deliver higher quality products then the firm. 
The present model also includes the results derived in Albaek and Schultz (1998) as a special case. Ignoring 
differences in product quality, the quantity coordination problem of the cooperative turns out to be a comparative 
advantage and all farmers  should become  members of  the cooperative in an open-membership equilibrium. 
Assuming  0 = s ,  0 = f , and  0 = l  we find that the profit of cooperative members always exceed those of 
farmers  delivering  to  the  firm  as  long  as  1 > F n   (see  proposition  5  in  the  appendix).  The  present  analysis 
however suggests that the superior performance of cooperatives suggested in Albaek and Schultz will disappear 
in markets where consumers care about product quality ( 0 > s ). A deeper examination of an open membership 
setting in this case is beyond the scope of this paper. 
6. Conclusions and extensions 
The present paper investigates the incentives to supply high quality products in a vertically related industry. 
Quality choices of an investor-owned firm and a producer cooperative are analyzed within a monopoly as well as 
mixed  duopoly  framework.  Assuming  that  the  members  of  the  cooperative  independently  decide  about  the 
quantity and the quality they deliver (decentralised decision making) there is a strong incentive to free-ride and 
to deliver high quantity and low quality (quantity and quality coordination problem). The investor-owned firm 
on the other hand is characterised by a centralised decision making process and, by assumption, is not plagued 
by a coordination problem. 
Comparing the behaviour of the two organisations (cooperative and firm) in a monopolistic market position we 
find that a cooperative will never produce higher quality than an investor-owned firm, as the cooperative faces a 
quality  coordination  problem.  The  problems  according  to  quality  get  more  severe  if  the  members  fail  to 
coordinate their output decisions and therefore tend to overproduce (free-riding according to quantity). 
In a mixed duopoly setting the incentives for the competitors to supply higher-quality products depend on the 
way  in  which  the  quality  of  the  final  product  is  determined  from  the  inputs  delivered  by  upstream  firms 
(farmers). In a general setting, where the quality of the final product is the average of the quality of inputs 
delivered by farmers, the free-riding problem is strong enough to ensure that the quality of the cooperative’s 
final product will never be above the quality of the firm’s composite good. In the special case of the ‘O-Ring 
form’  in  the  production  process  of  aggregate  quality  (which  implies  that  the  quality  of  the  manufacturers’ 
composite good is the minimum of the quality levels of its components), the free-riding problem is mitigated, as 
one member cannot receive the market price for high quality products without delivering high quality inputs 
himself. Despite the coordination problem, the cooperative’s product can be of higher quality than the product 
supplied by the firm.  
The theoretical analysis further suggests that the quantity and quality control problem within the cooperative are 
interrelated.  Introducing  measures  to  coordinate  quantity  decisions  of  members  helps  to  mitigate  the 
coordination and free-riding problem with respect to product quality within the cooperative. In situations, where 
the  quality  of  inputs  supplied  to  the  cooperative  is  more  difficult  to  verify  than  the  quantity  delivered  (in 
practice, the quality of inputs might be non-contractible between independent members of the cooperative), any 
attempt to coordinate quantities will be a suitable second best choice which indirectly also contributes to a higher 
level of product quality of the cooperative’s product. 
Whether the firm and the cooperative will offer high or low quality in equilibrium will also depend on factors 
which are not explicitly included in this model. The equilibrium outcome might be determined by the visibility 
of cheating (free-riding) and on the possibility of punishment. It is well known that repeated interaction between 
members helps to achieve a cooperative outcome. The results obtained further are likely to be sensitive to our 
assumptions about the specification of consumer preferences with respect to quality (Tirole, 1988, p. 101) as 
well as on the assumptions concerning the cost of quality (Huffman, 2005). In addition, the extent to which the 
degree of competition between manufacturers influences the quality decisions in a mixed duopoly has not yet 
been investigated in detail.  
Finally, our results are derived under the assumption that the number of upstream firms (farmers) patronising one 
of the two manufacturers is exogenously given (closed membership). In contrast, an open-membership model 
would determine the share of farmers delivering to the cooperative and to the firm endogenously: this share will 
depend on the relative level of profits associated  with  supplying one of the two  manufacturers.  A detailed 
analysis of quantity and quality decisions in an open-membership model is beyond the scope of the present  12 
 
paper.
15 Our result, however, that members of the cooperative tend to supply products of lower quality (and thus 
realize lower profits) causes doubts upon the finding of Albaek and Schultz (1998), who conclude that ‘in the 
long run all farmers would be members of the cooperative’ (p. 401). Our model suggests that the profitability of 
cooperatives depends on consumers’ preferences for quality, as well as the way in which the aggregate quality is 
produced from the individual inputs delivered. These characteristics need not be identical for all products and 
might  also  differ  between  individual  countries.
16  We  hope  that  our  paper  will  spur  further  theoretical  and 
empirical research on the issue of product quality supplied by different organizations along these lines. 
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Table 1: Payoff matrix for members of the cooperative (monopolist) 
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Figure 1: Isoprofit curves of the firm and the cooperative in a monopoly market 
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